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THE LAW'S DELAY
By Bentley M. McMullin of the Denver Bar
MONG the evils, none would willingly live to bear,
but for the dread of something after death, Hamlet
listed "the law's delay". Delays in justice caused the
barons to wrest from King John at Runnymede the pledge
"To none will we sell, to none will we deny, to none will we
delay right or justice". The roots of interminable and endless litigation, exemplified in Bleak House's Jarndyce and
Jarndyce, strangled property rights in this country as well as
in Great Britain, until the pressure of reform brought about
the English Judicature Act of 1873 and the earlier and contemporaneous American codes. Present day conditions in
civil practice show that the courts are again out-distanced by
society's speedy pace and that an accelleration of judicial
civil machinery is again necessary.
That such accelleration can be achieved has been proven
in the once notoriously dilatory criminal field. In recent
years there has been such a continuous wringing of hands at
the alleged eternal procrastination of American criminal justice, and such a hue and cry about the speed and certainty
with which the English courts are said to function, that criminal charges have at length come, in Denver trial courts at
least, to be promptly and speedily disposed of. One or two
months, and sometimes less, is now here regarded as sufficient
time in which to deprive a once free man of liberty and the
pursuit of happiness and even of his right to life itself. With
courts functioning so swiftly when dealing with the most vital
of human rights, it is difficult to see why, in mere matters of
property and commercial transactions, they should still creep
painfully toward an obvious and simple goal. If a court can
hang a man in thirty days, why need it take six months to reduce a simple promissory note to judgment?
That even a common action on a note can be made to
cost the most diligent plaintiff more than six months precious
time and endless hard work is a simple fact, familiar to every
lawyer, "and so is the further circumstance that the time consumed bears no relation whatever to the merits of defense, if
any. In an energetic and vigorous system such delays in civil
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procedure would be unthinkable; the purpose of litigation is
not delay, nor formal perfection, nor genteel horse-play; it is
the achievement of justice. Justice delayed ceases to be such.
Courts must, therefore act promptly, directly, quickly, or they
partially fail.
The effect of such failure is far from theoretical. The
credits tied up in useless litigation are withdrawn from the
resources of the community and their prompt return to the
channels of trade, particularly in a period of credit stringency, is of the utmost importance. The amounts withdrawn
being in the aggregate enormous, and varying directly with
the length of their withdrawal, useless delay must cast a heavy
burden upon commerce. The mere cost of prolonging litigation is itself considerable, and this additional cost must also
be finally passed on to the public. The legal profession likewise bears the burden, for business men, knowing of the delays ahead of them in the courts, use legal proceedings only
as a last and desperate resort when all else has failed, preferring to secure protection through credit associations, insurance, and the employment of lay agencies who thrive more
because of their contrasting promptness than for any other
reason, and who handle a vast amount and variety of legal business. The effect upon the legal profession needs no emphasis,
and shows the necessity, not only to the community, but to the
lawyers who attempt to serve it, of speeding up court proceedings wherever possible without disturbing the substantial
rights of litigants.
It will probably be agreed that the principal causes of
unnecessary delay in ordinary civil procedure are that motions and demurrers neither having nor supposed to have
merit can be and are filed for purely dilatory purposes; that
these motions and demurrers are not promptly disposed of
when filed; that it is possible to compel a plaintiff to go thru
the form of perfecting his pleadings and to prepare for trial
where no defense at all exists; and that continuances are too
frequently granted for wholly insufficient reasons. With these
causes stated, certain definite remedies suggest themselves.
First, the summary disposition of motions. Instead of
noticing, setting and final argument on weekly motion days,
all of which requires from two to three weeks time, motions
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should stand for argument without notice three days after
filing at a daily morning court session, and should then be
summarily heard and determined. They seldom go to the
merits, are nearly always waived by pleading over, and in
exceptional cases, where a real question arises, further time
for briefs and decision can be reserved by the court.
Second, the imposition of costs for frivolous motions and
demurrers. Litigants causing needless delay by dilatory
pleadings would do so less frequently if the penalty were the
payment of double or triple costs, at the time.
Third, the awarding of attorneys fees as costs. One reason for the reputed celerity of English justice lies in the fact
that a successful litigant recovers his attorney's fees. There
are few litigants who wish to purchase delay at its real cost
to their opponent.
Fourth, the entry of summary judgments in commercial
matters upon proof of lack of meritous defense. If at the
time of filing a complaint based on a note, account, or other
commercial transactions, the plaintiff sets forth that the defendant has no real defense and if the defendant fails to show
by counter affidavit that such defense exists, the plaintiff
should not be compelled to get the case at issue, prepare his
proof and await trial; judgment can and should be then entered summarily. This or a similar method is extensively
used, at this date, in Connecticut, Massachusetts and New
York, and can be readily adopted to use elsewhere.
Fifth, continuances should be allowed only upon legal
grounds. Courtesy to counsel in matters of continuances is
misguided; what both parties want and need is a termination
of the litigation.
These simple reforms, requiring but little legislation to
effectuate them, are respectfully submitted as ways of aiding
our courts to achieve their maximum efficiency and usefulness to the community in general and to business in particular.
(')The following table illustrates the time that may be required to prosecute to
judgment an ordinary civil action in the Denver District Court, assuming the plaintiff
to act as promptly as possible and the defendant to exert every possible means of
delaying final judgment. This will serve to illustrate that six months is a conserva-
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tive estimate of the time required. It will probably be agreed that even the ten months
shown here is frequently exceeded, for one cause or another.
Days
1 Complaint filed.
20 Motion for Cost Bond filed.
21 Notice to set Motion for Cost Bond for hearing, served.
22 Motion for Cost Bond set for hearing.
32 Motion for Cost Bond granted; bond filed; time to jlead allowed.
42 Motions to strike, to make more specific, or for Bill of Particulars filed.
43 Notice to set motion to strike, etc., served.
44 Motion to strike, etc., set for hearing.
54 Motion to strike, etc., overruled; time to demur allowed.
64- Demurrer filed.
65 Notice to set demurrer served.
66 Demurrer set for hearing.
76 Demurrer overruled; time to answer allowed.
86 Answer filed.
87 Reply filed.
97 Motion to strike parts of reply filed.
98 Notice to set motion to strike parts of Reply served.
99 Motion to strike parts of reply set for hearing.
109 Motion to strike parts of reply overruled.
119 Notice to set case for trial, jury demanded, served.
154- Case set for trial.
154 Case continued because counsel engaged in another trial.
164 Case continued because of illness of witness.
174 Case continued because of absence of another witness.
204 Case reached for trial.
205 Trial completed.
225 Motion for new trial.
226 Notice to set motion for new trial for hearing served.
227 Motion for new trial set for hearing.
247 Hearing on motion for new trial.
257 Motion for new trial overruled; 30 days stay of execution.
287 Expiration stay of execution.
288 Execution issues.
300 Miscellaneous delays unaccounted for.

The fundamental law of our land is a document that should be studied
not only for its principles but for the great genius that it displayed in encompassing the organic law of a great nation in so small a space and without
waste of words.-John J. Sullivan.

The design and object of the law is to ascertain what is just, honorable
and expedient; and when it is discovered it is proclaimed as a general ordinance equal and impartial to all.-Richard Olney.

The lawyer's great opportunity is to be useful, to teach the principles of
our form of government, to instill respect for law, to show why the law is,
and to spread good citizenship.-John G. Sargent.

